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Annotation
This study summarizes information regarding features of religious and church-religious selfdetermination of citizens of Ukraine for the period 2000-2021. Ukraine’s Western region is
traditionally characterized by a high level of religiosity, while the South and East of Ukraine
are the least religious. In recent years, the proportion of citizens who do not identify themselves
with any of the religions has increased. There is a significant difference between the level of
declared religiosity and identification with a particular religious community. As a result of the
military events in the East of Ukraine and the war with Russia, the number of believers and
Orthodox churches of the Moscow Patriarchate has significantly decreased, while the number
of Orthodox Churches of the Kyiv Patriarchate has increased. After receiving Tomos from the
Patriarch of Constantinople on December 15, 2018, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine gained
more authority in society. However, relations between the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate are characterized by the great
tension and conflict, which is expressed at the level of individual communities. Some problems
arose during the creation of a unified Orthodox Church in Ukraine, but they did not become
critical and did not affect the religious situation as a whole. Only 10% of citizens regularly
attend religious services and meetings. The decline in attendance at religious services during
the COVID-19 pandemic is accompanied by an increase in parishioner participation via the
Internet. Leading churches have a positive attitude towards the use of the latest technologies
and instant messengers. The article presents the results of surveys of focus groups. One of these
polls testifies to the desire of believers to have changes in terms of religious rituals, in
particular, the reduction of time, the understandable language of services and sermons, the
introduction of seating in Orthodox churches, or a more modest decoration of churches.
However, it has been established that for the growth of temple attendance, it is important not
so much to develop a network of places of worship, but to form the interest and motivation of
people to visit temples. Unfortunately, the level of recognition of the moral authority of the
Church is lower than the level of trust in it. Citizens believe that the largest Ukrainian Churches
in their approach to the problems of LGBT communities and other complex issues often take
a conservative position that does not meet the requirements of the time, rather than an active
position that contributes to solving social problems. Social service and assistance to people,
according to the majority of respondents, should occupy a leading place in the activities of the
Church. The greatest demand was for psychological assistance and protection of vulnerable
groups. The overwhelming majority support the assertion that the Church should be separated
from the state and the school from the Church. There is a high level of tolerance among citizens
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to the practice of different religions. A negative attitude is present only towards the UOC-MP,
but this is a consequence of the military invasion by Russia and the presence of scandals due
to provocative statements by the so-called “pro-Russian priests.” The activity of the latter was
banned by a number of local councils on the territory of Ukraine due to cooperation with the
aggressor country, and after the start of the Russian-Ukrainian war, it was outlawed. A deterrent
to inter-religious, inter-confessional and inter-church conflicts in Ukraine remains the fact that
religious and ecclesiastical identity is of little importance to citizens. It was found that in
Ukraine during the period of independence a special religious situation has formed,
characterized by multi-confessional tolerance and the almost complete absence of tension
among the various churches that successfully coexist, and often even cooperate with each
other.
Keywords: analytics, polyconfessionality, religious situation in Ukraine.

Formulation of the Problem
Ukraine is notable for its diversity in the religious sphere, yet serious religious conflicts
are not often encountered on its territory. After gaining independence in 1991, the borders of
Ukraine were opened to missionaries of various faiths. In the 1990s, there was a tremendous
increase in the interest of the population in faith and religion. Has this interest continued? The
purpose of this article is to examine the characteristics of the church and religious influence in
Ukraine today. Modalities of the church we examine include: the church’s status, trends,
problems; the attitude of Ukrainian citizens to the churches, requests and expectations; and
prospects for the development of the church –and religious influence in Ukraine in the face of
current external and internal challenges.
Main Results of the Study
The Church historically acts as a socio-cultural phenomenon; itinfluences daily
processes in the sphere of spiritual and ideological life, which radically transform the normative
regulation of relations between individuals. In the church's most recent activity, the inconsistent
application of confessional practices within the general public is noticeable. This shift toward
non-confession has a significant impact on the history of countries and peoples. This is
especially manifested in those countries where the majority of the population historically
professes one faith and, on the basis of it, forms their traditions and cultural memory. Among
those countries is Ukraine, in which Orthodoxy has been the official religion since 988 A.D.
However, modern society in the context of the globalization process emphasizes the
individual’s rights, and freedom of religion is characterized by acceptance toward diversity of
its religious composition. The Razumkov Center, together with the Representative Office of
the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Ukraine and with the support of the All-Ukrainian Council
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of Churches and Religious Organizations, conducted a large-scale study of the features of
religious and church-religious self-determination of Ukrainian citizens during 2000-2021, the
results of which were published on the Internet and are available to a wide range of readers.
During this period, Ukrainian society demonstrated a high level of religiosity. In 2014,
it reached the highest figure of 76% compared to 57% in 2000. Believers most often associate
religion or faith with spirituality, moral guidelines, and also a source of knowledge valuable
for the understanding of history and the development of civilization. Faith is also considered a
mystery, a sacrament, and an alternative approach to everyday life, routine, and daily problems.
Religion is also perceived as a force that unites people around certain values, certain principles
that they uphold, for which they are ready to fight even at the cost of their lives. Religious
values affect how societies build social relations and found state unions. Unbelievers and
atheists, alternatively, have defined religion as a way to influence people and manipulate their
minds. The superficial, demonstrative nature of religiosity, which often has nothing to do with
spirituality, is also emphasized by respondents who, during the survey, identified themselves
as non-believers or atheists. 1
Polls have shown that the following patterns persist: dependence of the level of
religiosity on gender, age, place of residence (urban/rural), and level of education. Generally
everywhere, the level of religiosity is higher in older age groups than in younger ones. There
are more believers among women than men (75% and 59%, respectively), and among rural
residents, more believers than urban residents (75% and 64%, respectively). Also, there is a
regional character of the level of religiosity of citizens. The South and East are traditionally
characterized by the lowest level of religiosity, the West - the highest. However, compared to
the level of the year 2000, the proportion of those who consider themselves believers in the
South and East grew, approaching the figures observed in the Central region of the country.
Participants in open responses explained regional specifics. In their opinion, this is a direct
consequence of historical events, because churches were destroyed more prevalently in the
South and East during the Soviet Union. At that time, atheism was preached in schools,
Christians were despised, and religiosity was not permitted to be instilled in children. 2

А. В. Арістова, “Релігія в Україні,” Велика українська енциклопедія, accessed October 4, 2022,
https://vue.gov.ua/%D0%A0%D0%B5%D0%BB%D1%96%D0%B3%D1%96%D1%8F_%D0%B2_%D0%A3
%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%97%D0%BD%D1%96. [A. V. Aristova, "Religion in Ukraine," Great
Ukrainian Encyclopedia]
2
Центр Разумкова, Особливості релігійного і церковно-релігійного самовизначення громадян України:
тенденції 2000-2021рр. (Київ, 2021), 5, https://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/article/2021_Religiya.pdf. [Razumkov
Center, Peculiarities of religious and church-religious self-determination of citizens of Ukraine: trends 2000-2021.
(Kyiv, 2021), 5,]
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Respondents’ declaration of belonging to a certain religious organization of the church
is not always associated with religious belief but may be attributed to socio-cultural or ethnic
identity. This principle is most typical for the group of “just Christians” among whom only
54% called themselves believers, while 25% vacillating between faith and unbelief, 7% nonbelievers or atheists, and 10% who are indifferent to religious issues. The self-identity of a part
of citizens with Orthodoxy can be directly related to socio-cultural identity.Evidence of this
phenomenon is confirmed by respondents’ accumulative strong sense of patriotism to Ukraine
in relationship with Orthodox affiliation. Citizens of Ukraine were asked whether they needed
to belong to a particular religion in order to affiliate themselves as authentic Uknrainians.
Respondents who answered positively to the question consider the OCU to be such a religion
(church). 3
As it turned out, the actual religious identity is much less important for citizens than the
civilian one, because 68% of respondents identify themselves precisely as “citizens of
Ukraine.” Christians of the UOC-MP most often identify themselves with people of their faith.
During the monitoring period, the majority of citizens were convinced that religious faith does
not imply mandatory religious certainty. 58% of those surveyed in 2021 believe that “a person
can just be a believer and not practice any particular religion.” This point of view clearly
prevails in all regions, with the exception of the Western region. The younger the respondents,
the more often they tend to believe that a person can be “just a believer.” 4
The distribution of confessional preferences of citizens of Ukraine since 2000 has not
changed much so far. By the beginning of 2021, 60% of those surveyed identify themselves as
Orthodox, 9% are followers of Greek Catholicism, and 8.5% of those who identified
themselves simply as Christians. Other denominations and religious trends are represented by
a much smaller number of followers. The proportion of those who do not identify themselves
with any of the religions, according to the study, is the highest for the entire period. Thus, over
the past few years, there has been a growing trend in the number of citizens who do not identify
themselves with any of the religions (Fig. 1).

“Історія релігії в Україні,” Тиждень, accessed October 4, 2022, http://week.dp.gov.ua/osvitniaprohrama/do91/istoriia-relihii-v-ukraini. ["The history of religion in Ukraine," Tzhden]
4
Центр Разумкова, Особливості релігійного і церковно-релігійного самовизначення громадян України:
тенденції 2000-2021рр. (Київ, 2021), 8, https://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/article/2021_Religiya.pdf. [Razumkov
Center, Peculiarities of religious and church-religious self-determination of citizens of Ukraine: trends 2000-2021.
(Kyiv, 2021), 8,]
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Fig. 1 Distribution of citizens of Ukraine by religious affiliation from 2000 to 2021 5
It should be noted that confessional self-determination retains an expressive regional
specificity. The largest number of Orthodox Christians is typical for the Center of Ukraine,
they are somewhat smaller in the South and East, while in the West their share is even smaller.
In turn, a significant part of the Westerners polled identify themselves as Greek Catholics.
Among older people (60+) the proportion of Orthodox is growing, while among young people

Центр Разумкова, Особливості релігійного і церковно-релігійного самовизначення громадян України:
тенденції 2000-2021рр. (Київ, 2021), 39, https://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/article/2021_Religiya.pdf.
[Razumkov Center, Peculiarities of religious and church-religious self-determination of citizens of Ukraine: trends
2000-2021. (Kyiv, 2021), 39]
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(18-23) the number of those who do not belong to any religion is growing. Tangible changes
are taking place in terms of the confessional-church self-determination of Orthodox believers
which is due to a change in the institutionalization of Orthodoxy in Ukraine. After all, until
2018, three largest Orthodox denominations legally and actually operated in Ukraine:
Ukrainian Autocephalous Church (UAOC), Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UPC under the
jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP); Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv
Patriarchate (UOC-KP). The majority of citizens identified themselves as “just Orthodox”
without belonging to any of the Orthodox churches.
By 2018, the proportion of “just Orthodox” has significantly decreased, but the number
of those who identify themselves as members of the UOC-KP has increased. The number of
UAOC believers constantly fluctuated around the one percent. The UOC-KP and the UAOC
united into the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), which in January 2019 received Tomos of
autocephaly from the Ecumenical Patriarchate, but already in May 2019, Honorary Patriarch
Filaret of the OCU withdrew his signature under the decision to establish the OCU and
proclaimed the restoration UOC-KP; however, it was deregistered and removed from the
Unified State Register of Legal Entities. These events disorientated many believers in their
church identification. Therefore, after 2018, the proportion of Orthodox who did not identify
themselves with any church organization increased again. Some citizens simply did not know
to which Orthodox Church they belonged. The current situation has strengthened the
manifestation of the so-called “dual identity,” when people recognize commitment and trust in
both church structures and their leaders, and the need to make a clear choice in favor of one of
them becomes a difficult task. The actions of Patriarch Filaret were negatively perceived by
the public. The majority of believers believed that he was simply fighting for power, thereby
harming the Church, and they condemned his actions. This situation made it possible to foresee
that in the future the “conflict of identities” might lead to a decrease in the number of those
who identify themselves with the UOC-KP., An increase in the number of those who identify
themselves with the OCU resulted, as confirmed by the findings of subsequent studies.
However, due to confusion, citizens still often misidentify themselves with one or the other
Orthodox Church, because they do not distinguish between their names. 6

Центр Разумкова, Особливості релігійного і церковно-релігійного самовизначення громадян України:
тенденції 2000-2021рр. (Київ, 2021), 10, https://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/article/2021_Religiya.pdf.
[Razumkov Center, Peculiarities of religious and church-religious self-determination of citizens of Ukraine: trends
2000-2021. (Kyiv, 2021), 10,]
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Fig. 2 Dynamics of affiliation of citizens to different Orthodox Churches of Ukraine for
the period 2019-2021 7
According to the results of the 2021 survey, the UOC-KP lost the majority of its
parishioners. To date, only 4.5% of citizens recognize themselves as its supporters. Due to this,
the number of OCU supporters increased from 20.3% in 2019 to 40.6% in 2021. The share of
“Just Orthodox” believers who have not decided or do not know which Orthodox church they
attend has decreased by almost 15% over three years, which indicates that these people were
able to identify themselves with a particular community. Most likely, the formation of the
Orthodox Church of Ukraine and the granting of autocephaly to it had a significant impact.
Most supporters of the UOC-MP are in Central and Eastern Ukraine, while 94% of
UGCC believers are citizens living in Western regions. As for the age-related representation
within believers, 39% of the believers of the UOC-MP are people over 60 years old, and only
7% are young people. However, most of all young people refer themselves to the group of “just
Christians” without identifying with any denomination. Another feature of the UOC-MP is that
68% of believers are women. Among the “just Orthodox” the number ofwomen and men are

Центр Разумкова, Особливості релігійного і церковно-релігійного самовизначення громадян України:
тенденції 2000-2021рр. (Київ, 2021), 45, https://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/article/2021_Religiya.pdf.
[Razumkov Center, Peculiarities of religious and church-religious self-determination of citizens of Ukraine: trends
2000-2021. (Kyiv, 2021), 45,]
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approximately equal, and among the “just Christians” and those who did not identify
themselves with any religion, the majority are men. 8
Describing church-confessional self-determination, researchers most often pay
attention to the nominal self-attribution of citizens to one or another church, although
membership in a particular religious community should be a sign of churching. Membership in
the community was recognized only by 21% of the respondents. Thus, there is a significant
difference between the level of declared religiosity and the level of identifying oneself with a
particular religious community. Older people and rural residents are more likely than younger
and urban residents to identify themselves as belonging to a particular community. However,
according to survey results, the proportion of members of religious communities increased
compared to the previous year among the believers of all three largest churches in Ukraine,
which confirms the conclusion about the multi-confessional nature of religiosity in Ukraine. 9
Rural residents attend church services more often than urban ones, and women more
often than men. Only 20% of respondents attend services once a week on a regular basis, 44%
attend church only on major holidays. In recent years, there has been a noticeable decrease in
the attendance of religious services by citizens of the Western regions, but this is largely due
to the strengthening of the COVID-19 pandemic and, accordingly, citizen quarantine Within
Western regions, the incidence rates of COVID-19 were the highest. During the pandemic,
many churches began to broadcast services on the Internet. In the Western region,s they are
distinguished by the largest number of believers who participate in services online. The
believers of the UGCC are also most favorable to the use of the latest technologies, which
explains their high activity in the Western regions. Most of the respondents attend church
services for one or more of the following reasons: communication with God, participation in
prayers, religious rites, to get away from everyday worries, because of the desire to listen to a
sermon, to solve moral problems, and to be among like-minded people. Also, a significant part
of the believers noted that they attend church services all their lives and this is their habit, while
the other part receives material or spiritual support from the community. In terms of motivation,

Центр Разумкова, Особливості релігійного і церковно-релігійного самовизначення громадян України:
тенденції 2000-2021рр. (Київ, 2021), 12, https://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/article/2021_Religiya.pdf.
[Razumkov Center, Peculiarities of religious and church-religious self-determination of citizens of Ukraine: trends
2000-2021. (Kyiv, 2021), 12]
9
Тетяна Фойт, “Не просто йти до церкви!,” ДивенСвіт, last modified January 23, 2017, accessed October 4,
2022, https://dyvensvit.org/blogs/1006187/. [Tatyana Foyt, "Don't just go to church!" DivenSvit]
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residents of the Southern region stand out, because for them the leading motive is that attending
a religious service calms and allows you to forget everyday worries. 10
Most of the citizens who attend churches believe that nothing needs to be changed,
everything suits them. With regard to the modernization in the structural arrangement of
churches, some believers attest that more attention should be paid, alternatively, to: various
types of assistance to community members, to simplification of rituals, to reduction in the
duration of services, and that more attention be given to the psychological support of
community members. Basic religious teaching for members of the community and performace
of services in native languages were much less frequently requested.
It is proposed that more church funds be invested in educational and humanitarian
programs instead of maintaining lush temples and expensive cars. Those who belong to the
UOC-MP are distinguished by the greatest conservatism and restraint. From 9% to 13% of
believing citizens of Ukraine provide material support to the church on a regular basis. A
significant portion of the people, several times a year, pays the requirements or donates funds
to their church. Among the faithful of various churches, members of the UGCC most often
provide regular assistance to the Church. 11
Along with the Armed Forces of Ukraine and various volunteer organizations, the
church enjoys a fairly high level of public trust. This indicator reached its highest level in 2010
and amounted to 72.5%. The Church is perceived in Ukraine primarily as a non-state spiritual
institution, independent of politics, which is called upon to promote moral and spiritual values;
this is very significant. Epiphanius, Metropolitan of Kyiv and all Ukraine, enjoys the greatest
authority. A negative trend towards a decrease in trust is noted only in relation to the Patriarch
of Moscow and All Russia. As for the general attitude of citizens towards different religions,
74% have a positive attitude towards Orthodoxy. 37% of respondents have a positive attitude
towards Greek Catholicism, 31% towards Roman Catholicism, from 11% to 14% of
respondents have a positive attitude towards Protestantism, Islam, and Judaism.
Representatives of Greek Catholicism in the Western regions of Ukraine have the most
negative attitude towards Protestants. Negative attitudes towards Islam and Judaism are
somewhat more pronounced among representatives of the older age group. The thesis that only

“Як змінювалась релігійність українців з 2000 року. Короткий переказ великого дослідження Центру
Разумкова,”
LB.ua,
last
modified
February
2,
2022,
accessed
October
4,
2022,
https://lb.ua/society/2022/02/02/504398_yak_zminyuvalas_religiynist.html. ["How has the religiosity of
Ukrainians changed since 2000. A brief retelling of the major research of the Razumkov Center," LB.ua]
11
“Про УГКЦ,” Українська Греко-Католицька Церква, accessed October 4, 2022,
https://ugcc.ua/church/about/. ["About the UGCC," Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church]
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religions traditional for Ukraine have the right to exist is most supported in the West. As of
2021, believers surveyed think that religious conflicts between the faithful of different churches
occur mainly around property and buildings, due to political contradictions, division of power
and spheres of influence. 12
Patriarch Kiril is critically perceived by Ukrainian Orthodoxy because of his support
for Russian aggression in the East and the war that began on February 24, 2022. This war raised
the question in general about the existence of Orthodox churches of the Moscow Patriarchate
on the territory of Ukraine, because in the conditions of war, this organization acts in support
of the aggressor country. In the spring of 2022 alone, the number of Orthodox in the Moscow
Patriarchate has halved. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine has banned the
involvement of priests of the UOC-MP in the chaplain service. This is consistent with the order,
which notes that “priests whose spiritual centers are located on the territory of the aggressor
country are not allowed.” After Russia's invasion of Ukraine, a number of local councils, for
security reasons, decided to suspend or ban the activities of the UOC-MP. 13
In 2022, about 600 Orthodox communities withdrew from the UOC-MP. Most of them
moved to the OCU, and some are still hesitating. In total, after the creation of the OCU, more
than 1,100 MP communities joined it, more than half after the start of a new phase of Russian
aggression against Ukraine. A significant part of the parishes moved with their superiors, but
in most cases the communities changed jurisdiction without the consent of the leadership. This
has often led to local conflicts. 14
There were cases of anti-Ukrainian statements by the so-called pro-Russian priests, or
their cooperation with the aggressor country. For example, Metropolitan Yelisey, a bishop of
the UOC-MP, who supported the Russian authorities during the occupation of Izyum, Kharkiv
region, was removed from his post. He was seen at events held by Russia during the occupation,
and spoke out in the media in support of the position of the Moscow Orthodox Church. He

Центр Разумкова, Особливості релігійного і церковно-релігійного самовизначення громадян України:
тенденції 2000-2021рр. (Київ, 2021), 123, https://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/article/2021_Religiya.pdf.
[Razumkov Center, Peculiarities of religious and church-religious self-determination of citizens of Ukraine: trends
2000-2021. (Kyiv, 2021), 123]
13
Лариса Волошка, “Аваков заборонив брати капеланами священиків УПЦ МП, центр якої – на території
агресора,” Новинарня, last modified August 17, 2017, accessed October 4, 2022,
https://novynarnia.com/2017/08/17/avakov-zaboroniv-brati-kapelanami-svyashhenikiv-upts-mp-tsentr-yakoyina-teritoriyi-agresora/. [Larisa Voloshka, "Avakov forbade the hiring of priests of the UOC MP, whose center is
on the territory of the aggressor, as chaplains," Novynarnia]
14
Тарас Антошевський, “Пів року без МП: декілька сотень парафій УПЦ сказали прощай патріархатуокупанту,” RISU, last modified September 6, 2022, accessed October 4, 2022, https://risu.ua/piv-roku-bez-mpdekilka-soten-parafij-upc-skazali-proshchaj-patriarhatu-okupantu_n131715. [Taras Antoshevskyi, "Half a year
without MP: several hundred parishes of the UOC said goodbye to the occupying patriarchate," RISU]
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condemned the decision to form the UOC and receive Tomos. After the de-occupation of most
of the territory of the Kharkiv region in September, Yelisey was seen on the territory of the
aggressor state. 15
During 2000-2021, the level of moral authority of the church in Ukraine decreased from
56.3% to 47.9%. The authority of the church is falling because believers regard that: the
hierarchs of churches are not models of morality, the church does not respond to the demands
and problems of modern life, and it demands benefits for itself in paying for energy suppliers.
Some of these benefits are manipulated through unfair taxation, selfish usage of land, and
gaining properties from insolvent citizens. The church does not change the order and duration
of services and sermons, apart from considering that this does not always correspond to the
modern pace and way of life. Older people go to church most often, and young people have
nothing to do there. The younger the respondents, the less often they tend to note the high moral
and spiritual qualities of the clergy.

What role does the church play in modern society?
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Альона Рязанцева and Софія Цвєткова, “УПЦ усунула Ізюмського митрополита Єлисея, який приймав
окупантів і втік до РФ,” Суспільне. Новини, last modified September 29, 2022, accessed October 4, 2022,
https://suspilne.media/286994-upc-usunula-izumskogo-mitropolita-elisea-akij-prijmav-okupantiv-i-vtik-do-rf/.
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Fig. 3 The role of the church in modern Ukrainian society as of 2021 16
During the study period, the positive social role of the church deserved a high
appreciation from citizens; however, with the outbreak of hostilities in the East of Ukraine in
2014, the proportion of people who noted the role of the church as positive significantly
decreased. However, by 2021, almost 50% of respondents positively assessed the role of the
church in society. Results suggested that 33% believe that religious organizations do not play
a significant role, and 4% assessed their roles as negative (Fig. 3).
As for the reaction of religious associations in Ukraine to the acute problems of our
time, it should be noted primarily that the citizens of Ukraine are little informed about the
position of the largest Ukrainian churches regarding a number of problems. Some of these
issues include environmental deline, global warming, mass migrations of the population,
attitude towards LGBTQ communities, international terrorism, and global warming. More than
half of the respondents did not know anything about the reaction or position of the churches
regarding these problems. This issue may indicate their lack of interest or the absence of a clear
position among the religious organizations themselves. Assessing which side the Church is on
in terms of “poor and disadvantaged” or “strong and rich,” citizens tend to believe that the
Church is more on the side of the “strong and rich.” The results of the latest poll, however, no
longer confirm this trend. According to the participants of the study, the OCU most adequately
responds to the challenges and problems of our time, although such results are dictated by the
greater prevalence of this organization and its popularity among citizens. 17
Over the past 20 years, there have been discussions amid Ukrainian citizens about
separation of church from state and school from church. The proportion of Ukrainian citizens
in agreement that this situation is a necessary condition for democracy and ensures the human
right to freedom of choice has increased significantly. 58% of citizens are convinced that the
Church should not interfere in relations between a person and the state, because Ukraine is
historically a multi-confessional country and the priority of any church will only cause
additional tension. This tension is anticipated within inter-church and church-state relations.
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Discrimination of believers of other churches is also expected. Only 18% of respondents as of
2021 consider it expedient to introduce a state church, 52% of them think it should be a church
like OCU. It is interesting that, despite the rejection of the idea of a state church by the majority
of citizens, they support the increasing involvement of the Church in participation in state or
public affairs. 18
Citizens have a negative or indifferent attitude to the public demonstration of their
religious behavior by some state figures of Ukraine. Also, compared with 2010, the proportion
of citizens who believe that religion should not be taught in general education schools has
increased. The number of those who support the idea of compulsory study of religion at school,
as well as those who believe that the basics of religious teachings can be taught as optional, has
decreased. The teaching of religion in schools is categorically opposed by most residents of the
East, South and Center, while the relative majority of Westerners are in favor of its optional
teaching. Representatives of many faiths are now present in the classes, and therefore it is not
necessary to teach Christianity so that there are no conflicts on this basis. Citizens are wary of
the introduction of a compulsory study of a religious subject in schools, because too much can
be abused. By abuse they mean the imposition of their understanding of “true Christianity” by
various religious organizations. Some respondents prefer that each denomination establish
Sunday schools, which can be attended by everyone, because this has always been the case
according to the Orthodox tradition.
As for the general attitude of citizens towards different religions, 74% have a positive
attitude towards Orthodoxy. 37% of respondents have a positive attitude towards Greek
Catholicism, 31% towards Roman Catholicism, from 11% to 14% of respondents have a
positive attitude towards Protestantism, Islam and Judaism. Representatives of Greek
Catholicism in the Western regions of Ukraine have the most negative attitude towards
Protestants. Negative attitudes towards Islam and Judaism are somewhat more pronounced
among representatives of the older age group. The thesis that only religions traditional for
Ukraine have the right to exist is most supported in the West. As of 2021, believers surveyed
believe that religious conflicts between the faithful of different churches occur mainly around

Центр Разумкова, Особливості релігійного і церковно-релігійного самовизначення громадян України:
тенденції 2000-2021рр. (Київ, 2021), 106–107, https://razumkov.org.ua/uploads/article/2021_Religiya.pdf.
[Razumkov Center, Peculiarities of religious and church-religious self-determination of citizens of Ukraine: trends
2000-2021. (Kyiv, 2021), 106–107]
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property and buildings, due to political contradictions, division of power, and spheres of
influence. 19
Relations between believers of different church organizations
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Fig. 4 Relations between believers of different churches and religions in Ukraine as of
2021 20
The majority of respondents note that relations between believers in the area where they
live are calm, another 11% noted that they are friendly, 3% that they are conflicted, and only
5% that they are tense. The greatest tension is observed in the Central regions. 39% believe
that high tension exists between the UOC and the UOC-MP, as well as between the latter and
the UOC-KP. People believe that the roots of the conflict are exclusively political and do not
see a religious component in it. The survey participants in the Western region consider the
relationship between the OCU and the UGCC to be friendly. Tensions between other religious
organizations are noted by only a few percent of the respondents, so we can conclude that there
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are almost no conflicts between other churches. In general, during the monitoring, Ukrainian
society demonstrated a fairly high level of tolerance towards the practice of different religions.
However, 47% consider it acceptable to ban certain religious organizations that are dangerous
for the state or have a dangerous psychological impact on people.
Conclusions
The period after Ukraine gained independence can be called a transitional stage, when
the structuring of society took place, the search for each citizen of his/her place in the economic,
social, cultural, and spiritual spheres transpired, because everything that existed before then
disappeared along with the Soviet Union. In a democratic society, every person has received a
real right to choose between being a believer, an unbeliever or an atheist. There was a
crystallization of worldview positions, which was followed with a series of annual surveys.
This choice is still happening, but it has been significantly deformed by a litany of crises. These
include the severe crisis of all public spheres, social insecurity, the oppression of basic
necessities of life, the shock of the war in the East since 2014, environmental disasters, and
pointedly, the unexpected Russian attack on February 24, 2022 that killed many people.
Families were separated or homeless, and the war dragged on for months. In such conditions,
many people turned their eyes to religion, in the age-old foundations of which they seek to find
support for their precarious position.
In Ukraine, the expressive regional character of all aspects of religious and
confessional-church self-determination of Ukrainian citizens is preserved: the Western region
is traditionally characterized by a high level of religiosity, while the South and East are the
lowest. The attribution of some citizens to one or another religion or confession is associated
mainly with socio-cultural or ethnic identity, rather than with religious spheres. The Church in
Ukraine is an essential factor in the democratization of the life of society on the basis of
Christian values. It forms a socially active position of believers in defending their civil rights,
which serves the interests of the formation and development of civil society. A fifth of citizens
have an unstable religious or confessional-church identity due to disputes between Orthodox
churches, and over the past few years, there has been a growing trend in the number of those
who do not identify themselves with any of the faiths. The proportion of citizens in agreement
about the separations of church from state, and school from church, are necessary conditions
for a democratic state. The belief that these separations ensure the human right to freedom of
conscience has increased. In the Western region, more often than in others, believers believe
that only religions traditional for Ukraine have the right to exist.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (OCTOBER 2022) XLII, 8

36

The most conflictogenic relations are between the two Orthodox churches, the
Orthodox Church of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (MP). The latter was banned
due to cooperation with the aggressor country, and many of its communities came under the
jurisdiction of the UOC. The level of actualized conflict in relations between representatives
of different religious organizations in Ukraine is low, and since religious identity is much less
important for citizens than civil identity, the emergence of religious conflicts in Ukraine in the
near future seems unlikely.
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